Bringing Justice and Enforcing Peace? An Ethnographic Perspective on the Impact of the Special Court for Sierra Leone by Mieth, Friederike
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives License. 
ISSN: 1864–1385
Bringing Justice and Enforcing Peace? An Ethnographic 
Perspective on the Impact of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone
Friederike Mieth, Center for Conflict Studies, Philipps University Marburg, Germany
urn:nbn:de:0070- i jcv-2013127
IJCV: Vol. 7 (1) 2013, pp. 10 – 22
Vol. 7 (1) 2013
Editorial (p. 3)
Introduction: Transitions from Violence – Analyzing the Effects of Transitional Justice Thorsten Bonacker / Susanne 
Buckley-Zistel (pp. 4 – 9)
Bringing Justice and Enforcing Peace? An Ethnographic Perspective on the Impact of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone Friederike Mieth (pp. 10 – 22)
Contesting International Norms of Transitional Justice: The Case of Timor Leste Eva Ottendörfer (pp. 23 – 35)
Transitional Justice: History-Telling, Collective Memory, and the Victim-Witness Chrisje Brants / Katrien Klep 
(pp. 36 – 49)
Guest Editorial: Qualitative Research on Prejudice Felix Knappertsbusch / Björn Milbradt / Udo Kelle (pp. 50 – 56)
Racism, Differentialism, and Antiracism in Everyday Ideology: A Mixed-Methods Study in Britain Peter Martin 
(pp. 57 – 73)
“It Depends How You’re Saying It”: The Complexities of Everyday Racism Jessica Walton / Naomi Priest / Yin 
Paradies (pp. 74 – 90)
The Meaning of Anti-Americanism: A Performative Approach to Anti-American Prejudice Felix Knappertsbusch 
(pp. 91 – 107)
How Racist Violence Becomes a Virtue: An Application of Discourse Analysis E. Rosemary McKeever / Richard Reed / 
Samuel Pehrson / Lesley Storey / J. Christopher Cohrs (pp. 108 – 120)
Dealing with Discrimination and the Struggle for Social Advancement in Migrant Families: Theoretical and 
Methodological Aspects of a Study on Adolescent Generational Dynamics in Turkish Migrant Families Subjected to 
Marginalization Vera King / Hans-Christoph Koller / Janina Zölch (pp. 121 – 134)
Economic Prosperity as “Narcissistic Filling”: A Missing Link Between Political Attitudes and Right-wing 
Authoritarianism Oliver Decker / Katharina Rothe / Marliese Weißmann / Johannes Kiess / Elmar Brähler 
(pp. 135 – 149)
“I Am First and Foremost a Man of Logic” – Stereotyping, the Syndrome Character of Prejudice, and a Glance at 
Anders Breivik’s Manifesto Bjoern Milbradt (pp. 150 – 163)
The Dynamics of the Creation, Evolution, and Disappearance of Terrorist Internet Forums Manuel Ricardo 
Torres-Soriano (pp. 164 – 178)
The Effect of Youth Demographics on Violence: The Importance of the Labor Market Noah Q. Bricker / Mark C. 
Foley (pp. 179 – 194)
Focus Section 2:  
Qualitative Research on 
Prejudice
Open Section
Focus Section 1:  
Transitions from Violence – The 
Impact of Transitional Justice
IJCV : Vol. 7 (1) 2013, pp. 10 – 22
Friederike Mieth: The Impact of the Special Court for Sierra Leone 11
Bringing Justice and Enforcing Peace? An Ethnographic 
Perspective on the Impact of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone
Friederike Mieth, Center for Conflict Studies, Philipps University Marburg, Germany
The Special Court for Sierra Leone was set up in 2002 to try those who bear the greatest responsibility for actrocities perpetrated during a decade-long civil 
war in the country. This would, according to Court officials and observers, bring justice to the victims of the war and contribute to peace. Based on eight 
months of ethnographic fieldwork in Sierra Leone between 2010 and 2012, this article challenges those assumptions by exploring the viewpoint of ordinary 
Sierra Leoneans. The impact of the Special Court on the lives of ordinary people is rather small, first and foremost because they have a different understanding 
of what justice constitutes and who is able to provide it. This resulted in low expectations of the Court from the beginning. Moreover, the relevance of transi-
tional justice fades in the context of daily challenges and remaining injustices. While the Special Court is viewed more positively as contributing to the peace, 
transitional justice institutions should engage more critically with the local context they operate in.
This article explores the impact of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone (hereafter “Special Court” or “Court”) on the 
lives of ordinary Sierra Leoneans. Two common assump-
tions are scrutinized: that by holding perpetrators account-
able the Special Court brings justice to the victims of the 
war, and that the Court contributes to lasting peace. Using 
data gathered during eight months of ethnographic field-
work conducted from October 2010 to April 2012, I 
describe Sierra Leoneans’ perceptions of the Special Court 
and their ideas about justice, accountability, and peace.
The article fills a gap in the existing literature about the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone. Firstly, the majority of the 
literature available on the Special Court is of a legal nature 
and thus concentrates on the legal impact of the institu-
tion. In this context, some of the Court’s “firsts” are dis-
cussed: The Court was the first hybrid war crimes tribunal 
that sought to combine international and national law. It 
was also the first time the recruitment of child soldiers and 
gender based crimes such as sexual slavery were considered 
as crimes against humanity. Discussion of these legal fea-
tures often characterizes analysis of the impact of the 
Special Court on international law (Lamin 2003; Smith 
2004; Tejan-Cole 2009).
Secondly, while a number of academic publications and 
practical reports address the impact of the Special Court, 
the majority of these analyze the impact of the Court from 
an external, top down, or again overly legalistic angle, hence 
using the same (Western) parameters from which the Court 
originated. Many scholars scrutinize the proceedings, as 
well as the selections of cases, fairness of trials, witness pro-
tection and security issues, transparency of the process, and 
outreach activities of the Court (Arzt 2006; Perriello and 
Wierda 2006; Staggs 2006; Jalloh 2011; Lincoln 2011). For 
example, Donna E. Arzt examines the local perception of 
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the Special Court but does so only within pre-set categories 
such as legitimacy or impartiality (2006). Other studies use 
survey data focusing more on knowledge about the Court 
and the effectiveness of the Court’s outreach program in 
informing Sierra Leoneans about its work and principles 
(Sawyer and Kelsall 2007; Kerr and Lincoln 2008).
The impact of the Special Court on people’s lives, however, 
has received little attention so far. While anthropologists 
Rosalind Shaw and Michael Jackson do not specifically look 
at a possible impact of the Special Court, their work hints 
that such a tribunal might not have the same meaning 
locally as is ascribed to it internationally. Jackson’s observa-
tions of 2002 – while the Court was being established – 
reveal that many of the Sierra Leoneans he spoke to did not 
seem to be looking for justice and instead wanted to move 
on (2004). Similarly, Shaw argues that healing and social 
recovery after the war took place through what she called 
“social forgetting,” which allowed Sierra Leoneans to move 
on with their lives (2005, 9). In a later contribution, Shaw 
explores the meaning of the discourse of forgiveness after 
the war in northern Sierra Leone and finds that people’s 
ideas of what constitutes justice differ from the concept of 
justice used by transitional justice institutions such as the 
Special Court (Shaw 2010). Such data raises rather funda-
mental questions regarding the idea of a war crimes tribu-
nal, which I will take as a starting point.
The findings presented in this article are the result of an 
eight-month ethnographic study about dealing with the 
past in Sierra Leone. Combining many different data-
gathering techniques, such as participant observation, 
interviews, informal conversations, observations, group 
discussions, literature study, and interviews with pro-
fessionals, ethnographers seek deeper insights into how 
people view a situation in their own terms. In order to gain 
a better understanding of how people lived their lives, I 
stayed in different research locations for longer periods of 
time. These stays not only gave me an idea of how people 
talk and think about their experiences of dealing with the 
past and their view of the institutions involved, but more 
importantly how issues of dealing with the past are situated 
in the context of “normal” life. This makes ethnography a 
particularly suitable method for examining the perception 
of the Special Court in Sierra Leone and its impact on 
people’s lives.
While in Sierra Leone I conducted research mainly in three 
locations: First, in Madina, a small village near Makeni in 
northern Sierra Leone where I stayed, together with a 
research assistant, for a month and a half. Second, in Tom-
bodu, a larger village near Koidu in eastern Sierra Leone. 
While staying with a family in Koidu I went to Tombodu 
on day trips several times a week over a period of five 
weeks. In Koidu and Tombodu, I also enlisted the help of a 
research assistant. Third, I conducted research in the capi-
tal Freetown, where I stayed in several homes in the west-
ern and eastern districts of the city for about six months. I 
mostly used local transport throughout the country and in 
all locations I stayed in private homes; either they were 
assigned to me by the village chief or I was able to find 
accommodation with people or families I already knew. 
Throughout the research I avoided association with any 
formal organization.1
In order to learn about how people view their situation and 
how they perceive institutions like the Special Court, I had 
numerous informal conversations and conducted some 
forty-four more formal interviews in all of the above 
locations. The majority of the people I spoke to were “ordi-
nary” Sierra Leoneans, mostly farmers in the rural 
locations. The respondents were not selected according to 
specific criteria, as in the rural research locations my assis-
tants and I often approached people with whom we had 
already established a relationship. Nonetheless, the inter-
viewees cover all age ranges and men and women are 
equally represented. In Freetown, I drew on a similarly 
diverse network of people with whom I regularly inter-
acted: (former) college students, owners of small busi-
nesses, persons with occasional employment, housewives, 
1 Still, because of my mere appearance as a 
young white female, it is possible that people in 
some of the locations I visited less frequently may 
have assumed that I was a representative or “scout” 
for a particular program or an NGO employee. 
Hence I had to accept that some of the information 
I was given would have been influenced by such 
considerations.
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but also unemployed individuals living in the slums areas. I 
also took part in family and neighbourhood activities. In 
addition to this, I interviewed fourteen professionals with 
whom I discussed specific aspects. Conversations in the 
rural areas were often held in local languages (with 
research assistants acting as interpreters), as well as in Krio, 
an English-based creole language spoken widely in Sierra 
Leone. Most of the conversations in Freetown and with 
professionals were held in Krio or English.
This article examines the Special Court from the per-
spective of Sierra Leoneans. I will therefore refrain from 
more theoretical discussions of concepts like justice and 
accountability, which are frequently used by the Special 
Court, in order to concentrate on how Sierra Leoneans 
understand these issues. While I also sporadically use the 
categories of “victims” and “perpetrators,” I want to stress 
that in Sierra Leone, as in many other post-conflict situ-
ations, these are rather problematic terms because they 
mask the complexity of the post-war situation where people 
cannot easily be categorized into such clear-cut groups.
1. Background to the War and the Special Court for Sierra Leone
The civil war in Sierra Leone was not primarily a religious, 
ethnic, or politically motivated war.2 When a revolutionary 
movement entered from Liberia in 1991 and started to 
attack villages in the eastern parts of the country it was at 
first not taken seriously by many in the rest of the country. 
The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) sought to over-
throw the government, but soon lost credibility because of 
attacks on innocent civilians. The government sent a 
largely under-equipped army to fight the rebellion, and 
eventually army forces took to looting and killing as well. 
(Richards 1996; Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
2004; Keen 2005).
After pressure from civil society elections were held in 
1996, and later a peace agreement was signed between the 
government and the rebels. However, fighting soon 
re-erupted. Vigilante groups that had previously formed 
mainly in the southern part of the country were formalized 
into the Civil Defense Force (CDF) under the defense min-
istry, as the army was no longer trusted. CDF fighters – 
coming from the same background as military recruits and 
rebels – perpetrated similar atrocities on civilians, though 
on a smaller scale. From 1997 to 1998 a rogue section of 
the army (as the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, 
AFRC) and rebels joined forces and ousted the elected 
President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, who fled to Guinea. After 
West African peacekeepers reinstated the government, 
rebels and AFRC regrouped and launched a major attack 
on Freetown on January 6, 1999. This event heightened 
international awareness, which eventually led to renewed 
peace negotiations and the signing of the Lomé Peace 
accord in July 1999. Finally, when rebels and other splinter 
groups again violated the peace accord, the UN intervened 
with a full mission and British forces were deployed. The 
UN ran a demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration 
program, and in 2002 President Kabbah officially declared 
the war over (Keen 2005). Sierra Leone has since been 
peaceful, with three democratic elections held since the end 
of the war, in 2002, 2007, and November 2012. The most 
recent elections were the first the country organized on its 
own and were largely heralded as free and fair (BBC 2012).
The lack of clear fronts and ideologies was a characteristic 
feature of this war, which almost make it resemble a riot that 
had taken on a life of its own. During the research, people 
often told me that the war had “no head and no tail,” mean-
ing that it lacked any sense. For civilians it was difficult to 
distinguish between different fighting factions, or between 
combatants and non-combatants. All armed groups forcibly 
recruited (though the RUF was the most brutal in this 
respect), which further blurred the distinction between per-
petrators and victims (Abdullah 2004; Keen 2005).
The effects of the war on the population were so grave that 
almost everybody was affected. Of roughly four million 
2 For in-depth analyses of the war see Abdullah 
(2004), Keen (2005), Richards (1996), as well as the 
final report of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconcili-
ation Commission (2004).
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inhabitants of Sierra Leone at the time (UNDP 2011), one 
to two million were reported internally displaced, and half 
a million fled to neighboring countries. More than 50,000 
were killed. The most brutal atrocities included ampu-
tations, which were perpetrated mostly by rebel groups but 
also by other armed groups. About six hundred amputees 
survived the war, though it is estimated that more than 
four times as many amputations were performed during 
the war (Lord 2000; see also Ibrahim and Shepler 2011).
The Special Court for Sierra Leone was established jointly 
by the UN and the government of Sierra Leone in 2002 in 
response to a request by President Kabbah. The mandate of 
the Court was to “prosecute persons who bear the greatest 
responsibility for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the 
territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996” (Special 
Court for Sierra Leone 2002b). The Special Court indicted 
thirteen persons of whom eight are now serving prison 
sentences in Rwanda; the trial of Charles Taylor, former 
president of Liberia, is currently in the appeals phase after a 
verdict was announced on 26 April 2012 and sentence 
passed in May. Three trials were held in Freetown, covering 
the three main fighting factions during the war: RUF, CDF, 
and AFRC. The trial of Charles Taylor is being held in The 
Hague, Netherlands (Special Court for Sierra Leone 2011).
One particular detail about the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone was that the men who were eventually sentenced 
were relatively unknown. On the one hand this is due to 
the type of war that took place in Sierra Leone, where the 
rather loosely organized nature of the fighting factions 
meant that some of the individuals indicted by the Court, 
though high in the chain of command, were relatively 
unknown to the population. Some respondents told me 
that they trusted the Special Court to have found the right 
persons: “Yes, they said they are responsible for the war,” 
an older man told me in Tombodu:
What do you want me to say? We didn’t see them [during the 
war]. They said they were responsible, so are they not the ones that 
brought the war? Is that not so? What we were praying for was that 
the war wouldn’t come again. That is all we were praying for.
(Tombodu, January 2011)
However, this also hints at the possibility that people felt 
less personally involved from the beginning. On the other 
hand, and possibly unfortunately for the Court, four well-
known indicted commanders were never tried: Foday San-
koh, the leader of the RUF rebels, and Samuel Hinga 
Norman, former deputy defense minister and as such head 
of the CDF, both died in custody. Another well-known 
RUF leader, Sam Bockarie, was killed in Liberia, and 
Johnny Paul Koroma, the leader of the AFRC junta, was 
never arrested. Charles Taylor, though well known to many 
Sierra Leoneans, was the president of a neighboring 
country at the time of the war and had never entered Sierra 
Leone himself. His connection to the RUF was, from an 
ordinary Sierra Leonean perspective, rather abstract and 
based on hearsay.
2. Does Accountability Lead to Justice?
While its statutes do not state explicitly that justice will be 
sought for Sierra Leoneans, Special Court officials and 
observers often assume that holding perpetrators account-
able will bring justice to those affected by the war. As an 
example, when the RUF case was closed acting prosecutor 
Joseph Kamara said:
With the end of this trial, there is now a final recognition of 
their crimes. And there is a strong measure of justice and 
accountability for their victims – the families of those who were 
slaughtered, the women who were raped, the children forced to 
fight and kill, the many thousands who were mutilated and ter-
rorized.
(cited in Special Court for Sierra Leone 2009a)
At a UN Security Council briefing in July 2009, prosecutor 
Stephen Rapp asked for further support for the Special 
Court to fulfil its mandate “so that justice can be achieved 
for the victims of those crimes” (Special Court for Sierra 
Leone 2009b). Such language is mirrored by donors and 
observers. During a UN Security Council meeting in 2007, 
the US representative suggested that the work of the 
Special Court brings “a sense of justice to the innocent vic-
tims of the terrible crimes and atrocities that were per-
petrated in Sierra Leone” (Ms. Wolcott Sanders, cited in 
UN Security Council 2007). This was also reiterated by 
international human rights organizations such as Human 
Rights Watch:
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Accountability for serious human rights crimes, like those com-
mitted during Sierra Leone's war, is essential for several reasons: 
to bring justice to the victims, to punish the perpetrators, and to 
lay the foundation for building respect for the rule of law in 
post-conflict societies.
(Human Rights Watch 2004, 1)
The message to the Sierra Leonean people is illustrated 
quite simply by the poster shown in Figure 1. Here, justice is 
clearly depicted as something that will eventually be 
achieved for all Sierra Leoneans. This rhetoric is still used 
by Special Court officials, with the registrar of the Court, 
Binta Mansaray, stating in a 2012 interview that the institu-
tion was primarily “in the name of those who suffered” 
(cited in International Center for Transitional Justice 2012).
Figure 1: Poster for the Special Court Outreach Program
What is lacking in these statements is an explanation of 
how bringing perpetrators to justice will transform into 
justice for victims or, more generally, the people of Sierra 
Leone. In fact, ten years after the conflict and about three 
years after the Freetown trials concluded (with the RUF 
trial ending in 2009) the impact of the Special Court on the 
lives of Sierra Leoneans has rarely been discussed.
In contrast to the claims by Court officials, many Sierra 
Leoneans I spoke to described the work of the Court as 
irrelevant for them and stated that it has not brought jus-
tice to them. Their reasons can be loosely grouped into two 
categories: that their concept of justice differed from that 
of the Court, and that their everyday circumstances made 
the work of the Court less relevant for them.
Firstly, the kind of justice the Court was designed to deliver 
is based on an idea of retributive justice that stems from 
Europe and North America and differs in its approach 
from what the majority of my respondents would describe 
as justice. Most local and informal justice systems in Sierra 
Leone are similar to ideas of restorative justice, according 
to which victims should be compensated for their losses 
(Alie 2008, 136). Retributive justice, which is common in 
many Western societies, focuses on punishing perpetrators. 
In the light of this it is no surprise that many respondents 
did not perceive the work of the Court as achieving justice 
for them, because they would have expected “justice” to 
reach them in a tangible way. Rather, the work of the Court 
was perceived as abstract and distant. I sometimes asked 
directly how it made a person feel to know that some of the 
top commanders were now in prison, and quite often the 
answer was “I feel nothing.” Some respondents explained 
why the Special Court did not have any relevance in their 
lives:
This Special Court does not do anything for me and my own 
life. They could leave [the ex-combatants], they could kill them. 
What does it matter to me, it doesn’t do anything for me. […] It 
is their own law that they pass, isn’t it? [The ex-combatants] did 
bad, so they make them suffer the penalty. But they have already 
done the bad things, so what does that have to do with me? 
They don’t come and give me money. 
(woman in her late thirties, Bendu 2, Tombodu, February 2011)
Photographed by the author at a small memorial site in Tombodu, Kono district. Below the picture it 
says: “Together the Special Court and the people of Sierra Leone will move towards peace and justice.”
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The Special Court, they arrest the person because it’s the law, 
that’s what the law says. But if it’s just us […] It’s better they 
just leave them like that. Because even if they kill him, or he dies 
in prison, nothing will happen to me. Or, maybe […] all my 
family has gone, it is only me that is left over, you think that if a 
man, by his life alone going [to the Court], is what … it is stu-
pidity! 
(man in his twenties, Koidu, February 2011)
basis. Therefore, while the Court could speak of holding 
perpetrators accountable, in “real life” the majority of 
Sierra Leoneans had to find strategies to live with perpetra-
tors – sometimes with the very ex-combatants who had 
killed their own family members.
Moreover, many of the people I talked to were struggling to 
secure their livelihood, and consequently lacked interest in 
the work of the Court. In a country where access to very 
basic services like electricity, clean water, or health care is 
problematic (even in the capital), overall interest in the 
work of the Special Court was understandably low. The 
condition of structural inequality in Sierra Leone has of 
course already been raised many times, but from the per-
spective of the individual it remains critical. I found it 
striking to hear a man who testified as a witness before the 
Special Court explain that inside the Court, “it’s Europe.” 
Rather than reporting about the proceedings, he told his 
listeners about the lights, the computers, the white people, 
and the air conditioning.
Poverty is not the only reason for the lack of interest in the 
core work of the Court. In Freetown, I observed that the 
Special Court was very rarely a topic of conversation, not 
even when Charles Taylor's verdict was announced. Many 
people told me it simply had no relevance for them because 
they were caught up in other activities. A friend who was 
involved in a business told me that if I really wanted to talk 
about the war I should go to the rural areas, where people 
have the time to sit down “all day.” If I planned to talk to 
him, he warned me, he might “have to get up in the middle 
of the interview to do business” (man in his late thirties, 
Freetown, March 2012).
What I find more pertinent in this context, however, is that 
people could not relate to the messages of the Court 
because they continued to experience injustice in everyday 
life, even if not war-related. People in Freetown mostly 
spoke about high-level corruption, which regularly makes 
headlines. Similarly, in a village near Tombodu people sus-
pected that they were being denied development assistance 
by corrupt authorities. Trust in the police and the formal 
justice system is low, partly due to their being perceived as 
unfair. While I was in Koidu there was a small riot at a 
Throughout my fieldwork I was told that justice was ren-
dered by restoring things to how they were before. For 
instance, when discussing a recent reconciliation program, 
a woman in Tombodu told me that “they didn’t give me 
anything to make me forget” (Tombodu, Jan. 2011). When 
I asked what she meant, she explained that if somebody 
wants people to feel better about what happened, they 
should “make them as they were before.” For example, if 
they were traders before the war they should be given 
money to resume this occupation, she continued: “having 
that money in your hand, you will forget about what has 
happened” (woman in her forties, January 2011).
There were other voices of course. A woman in Madina 
said that she was content with the Court’s work: “I am 
happy about it because I want them to taste the bitterness 
that we faced during the war. They were supporting this. 
We experienced the hard life in the bush” (woman in her 
late forties, Madina, December 2010). However, she was in 
a minority in supporting the idea of such a “detached” 
punishment. With their notions of justice as a restorative 
action, it was difficult for the majority of Sierra Leoneans I 
talked with to understand how the work of the Special 
Court was to bring them justice if it did not have any direct 
influence on their situation.
Secondly, when assessing the impact of the Special Court 
on people’s everyday lives it is crucial to place the institu-
tion in its broader context and consider, for example, that 
with the mandate of the Special Court limited to trying 
those who bore the “greatest responsibility” for the war 
crimes, the majority of those who committed crimes dur-
ing the civil war were amnestied. This is one reason people 
often gave for their feeling that it was difficult to relate to 
the Court’s rhetoric: They were confronted with the chal-
lenge of living together with perpetrators on an everyday 
IJCV : Vol. 7 (1) 2013, pp. 10 – 22
Friederike Mieth: The Impact of the Special Court for Sierra Leone 17
school and an acquaintance complained that two pupils 
had been arrested at random. “In any other country,” he 
said, “they would pick [the boys] up from the street, but 
then they would start investigating the issue and inter-
rogate the boys. But here they just imprison them and take 
them to court.” (man in his forties, Koidu, February 2011).
Mistrust in institutions is so strong that people often 
refrain altogether from turning to the police or courts. In a 
conversation with the founding director of a Sierra Leo-
nean NGO that strives to improve access to legal assistance 
in the country, I was told:
People do not have faith in the justice system, and when they 
don’t, they don’t even bother to go there. So if they cannot get a 
solution using their customary system, they will just let it go. 
And they will not report a crime to the police, for example, 
because the next thing the police will do will be to arrest them 
and [take] them to court. You have many of those stories. … We 
have one now from a man … in Makeni, he saw a corpse in an 
unfinished house and he reported that to the police. Yes, he 
reported that to the police, and he was arrested as [a suspect]. 
And he was in prison for twenty-three months without any 
trial, we only got bail for him in December.
(S. Koroma, TIMAP for Justice, March 2012)
One is inclined to ask if the Special Court could not have 
made a contribution to improving the national justice sys-
tem in Sierra Leone, as this was actually one of the main 
reasons why it was designed as a hybrid institution. UN 
Security Council Resolution 1315 states that international 
cooperation could “assist in strengthening the judicial sys-
tem of Sierra Leone” (UN Security Council 2000). Simi-
larly, Human Rights Watch hoped that the Court would 
make a positive contribution to the restoration of the rule 
of law and Sierra Leoneans’ attitude towards the judicial 
system:
It is hoped that the Special Court will contribute to revitalizing 
Sierra Leoneans’ belief in the rule of law – that, in the face of 
future crimes, they will turn to the judicial system for recourse 
instead of either seeking revenge or fatalistically accepting what 
happened as “the way it is.” This is necessary to meaningfully 
combat the culture of impunity that has prevailed in Sierra 
Leone, to build respect for the rule of law, and to bring a sense 
of justice for the horrific crimes committed.
(Human Rights Watch 2004, 32)
While it would be beyond the scope of this article to exam-
ine the Court’s impact on the legal system in Sierra Leone 
in detail, it is debatable whether the majority of Sierra Leo-
neans will feel the effects of any possible improvements. 
Legacy activities of the Special Court are – by design – 
focused only on the formal judicial system, whose reach 
and capacity are seriously limited (Bangura 2005; Maru 
2005). As in many African countries, the legal landscape in 
Sierra Leone is characterized by legal dualism, where for-
mal courts coexist and sometimes overlap with customary 
law administered by chiefs or other local authorities. The 
formal justice system is limited almost exclusively to the 
capital, with ten of the eleven high court judges based in 
Freetown. Hence for the majority of Sierra Leoneans cus-
tomary law has more relevance, but it is often administered 
in a similarly unfair manner (Maru 2005, 20). Thus, even if 
the formal judicial system had benefited from the presence 
of the Special Court, little of this effect would have been felt 
by ordinary Sierra Leoneans, as the problem of injustice in 
the customary institutions would remain untouched.
The same can be said for the Court’s outreach activities 
such as town hall meetings and school visits, teaching the 
principles of human rights, international law, and the rule 
of law in general. Despite the many obstacles the program 
faced it has been praised for its achievements (Kerr and 
Lincoln 2008). However, while educating citizens in 
matters of human rights is important, it does little to 
change the fact that Sierra Leone’s justice system has effec-
tively been crippled since long before the war and that 
injustices prevail in both official and customary justice 
practices (Bangura 2005; Fanthorpe 2006).
Should the conclusion of this discussion then be that Sierra 
Leoneans simply accept injustice, especially that of the 
recent war? Faced with structural injustices that seem 
impossible to rectify, and the fact that most “perpetrators” 
are free, would it not be understandable if people have 
simply become fatalistic, as suggested in the Human Rights 
Watch Report cited above? The answers to these questions 
lie outside the realm of transitional justice institutions.
One idea almost everybody I met during the research 
agreed on was that there will be some kind of judgement 
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for a person’s actions, even if it will not happen in “this 
world”, i.e. in one’s own lifespan. People said that they 
“leave the judgement to God” or that a perpetrator will 
“meet his people.” Similarly, Jackson’s research assistant 
explained why people so often say they have already for-
given perpetrators: “[it] doesn’t mean that justice will not 
be done … most of us here feel that God sees everything 
and that God will mete out punishment in his own good 
time” (Jackson 2004, 68). And indeed, in many of my own 
conversations I noted that people seemed to have already 
accepted what happened to them and society as a whole, 
some of course more readily than others:
We don’t have problems with them [ex-combatants], actually. 
Because those things already happened. There is no other way. If 
I get money, I will be able to live fine with my family, is it not 
so? This we think of, nothing else. … The only thing is, they will 
get the judgement between them and God. Anything we 
humans do, we get the reward. You do good, the reward will be 
good. You do bad, the reward is bad. We don’t last here. Today, 
tomorrow, we are going. We are going to die, everybody is going 
to die! Is it not so? It’s only God who has his own judgement.
(woman in her late 30s, Tombodu, January 2011)
Shaw similarly grappled with generalizations about the 
“fatalistic” attitude of Sierra Leoneans made by inter-
national observers. She finds that rather than representing 
passiveness and fatalism, Sierra Leoneans’ calls to forgive 
and their idea of God’s justice can be understood as alter-
native ways of articulating justice. These more per-
formative actions may also symbolize the closure of cycles 
of revenge (2010, 223).
Another related idea is the concept of hake, which is a Krio 
expression that is also used by speakers of other local lan-
guages, and often occurs in this context (Shaw 2010, 223; 
Jackson 2004, 68). If a person has hake from somebody 
else, it means that he or she has wronged another person 
and this will be reflected in something happening to him or 
her later, as if in exchange. A simple example would be if 
two men have a business idea and one of them secretly goes 
ahead and sets up the business by himself, and then it fails, 
it is the other man’s hake following him. Some people used 
this concept to claim that former combatants are actually 
in a worse position than civilians now, not only as a result 
of their lack of education and use of drugs during the war, 
but also because of the civilians’ hake. One of my neigh-
bors in Freetown explained:
People say, now, the rebels, they’re going mad, they’re beggars 
on the streets, they’re dying, you know, they’re sick and what-
ever, they’re poor: they say na Salone pipul im hake (the Sierra 
Leonean people’s hake). It’s the bad things, [like a] bad omen, 
the Nigerians call it bad omen, it’s the bad things they’ve done 
to people. That’s what’s following them.
(woman in her twenties, Freetown, March 2012)
It is interesting to note that the concept of hake is not 
direct; it follows the wrongdoer like a portent, but is not 
something that is done to him or her directly in response 
to the wrongdoing. In that respect, hake differs from (the 
wish for) revenge. As with leaving judgement to God, this 
idea draws attention to the process of moving on rather 
than focusing on the punishment of the other. “Leave 
them. Let them deal with the hake” one man said during a 
group discussion in Tombodu, when some of the other 
men voiced their anger about a popular ex-combatant 
(man in his fifties, Tombodu, March 2011)
Coming back to the Special Court, it is worth recapitulat-
ing that in terms of bringing justice it has had a rather 
negligible effect on the lives of ordinary Sierra Leoneans. 
On the one hand, the kind of justice the Court pursued, 
retributive and limited to the legal sphere, did not coincide 
with local ideas of justice where, if at all, restorative 
actions would have been expected. On the other hand, the 
Court operated in a context where the majority of the per-
petrators had to be accepted into society, which required 
people to find strategies of coexistence. Coupled with 
ongoing injustices in the formal and customary legal sys-
tems, as well as the general hardship many people experi-
ence, the abstract notion of justice “brought” by the 
Special Court was often described as meaningless by ordi-
nary people.
However, this does not mean that the institution as such 
was regarded as meaningless. As I will describe below, the 
notion of accountability did resonate with Sierra Leoneans, 
if not for the sake of justice, then for ending the war. Sev-
eral of the people who knew about the Court attributed it 
with a positive influence on the peace process.
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3. Peace Without Justice
The Court’s outreach material states that its work is a step 
towards bringing peace to Sierra Leone, as explained in a 
pamphlet entitled “What is the Special Court?”:3
The Special Court started because Sierra Leoneans asked the 
world to help them try those people who are alleged to bear the 
greatest responsibility for crimes that occurred during the 
recent war. The international community answered that call 
because they believed that only by holding people accountable 
will Sierra Leone truly know lasting peace.
(Special Court for Sierra Leone Outreach Section 2003, 4)
Similarly, in 2002 prosecutor David Crane told during a 
public meeting in Freetown that “the [Truth and Reconcili-
ation Commission] and the Special Court are two key pil-
lars to stabilize the peace in Sierra Leone” (Special Court 
for Sierra Leone 2002). Similar language is used when the 
UN and the Court’s donors are addressed:
As President of the Special Court and as a Sierra Leonean, I 
hold the firm belief that the establishment of the Court repre-
sents a major contribution to long-term peace and security in 
Sierra Leone and the subregion.
(Justice King, cited in UN Security Council 2007)
As mentioned above, it is not explained exactly how the 
work of the Court will translate into a contribution to 
peace. Nevertheless, one positive observation from my 
fieldwork is that there is indeed widespread agreement that 
there is peace today. On the question of the Court’s con-
tribution to peace, answers were much more mixed, which 
can partly be explained with a lack of knowledge about the 
specific mandate of the Court.
Of those who were fairly well-informed about the Court, 
many regarded its role of helping to imprison the leaders of 
the armed groups as positive. Interestingly, the emphasis 
here was primarily on imprisonment and less on holding 
these leaders accountable for their actions. Many believed 
that the detention of those most responsible prevented 
them from prolonging the war and enabled or forced the 
rank and file combatants to stop fighting, which some con-
sidered to be a crucial step in the peace process. Here, 
people often described the role of the Special Court as 
holding these big men in a tight place (prison). For 
example, a young man from Madina explained:
The Special Court program, I don’t understand it much. The 
only help is the one that I told you of, where we heard that the 
Special Court arrested the big big men, the[n] we got cold 
hearts in this country. And the peace that we have is the one 
that I understand.
(man in his twenties, Madina, December 2010)
Thus, the prime reason why most people approved of the 
arrest of the “big men” was not that they would receive 
punishment for their actions but that they were now 
“under control,” removed from society, and this made 
peace possible. “We want the big big ones […] to be in a 
tight place first,” a woman in Madina told me, “because we 
don’t know what they have planned next. If the white 
people can talk to them, well it is nice, for us, it’s only the 
peace we want” (December 2010). This point was under-
lined when I realized that many were not interested in what 
happened to these “big men” after their arrest. While a 
young woman, interviewed in Waterloo,4 blamed RUF 
leader Foday Sankoh for starting the war, she was not even 
aware that he had passed away in the meantime. In her 
view, he would be judged anyway; after being told that his 
death had been natural, she mumbled: “Oh Sankoh. You 
will meet with God.” (woman in her thirties, Waterloo, 
November 2010)
Others clearly mentioned that the Court had a deterrent 
function and that it was part of the establishment of the 
rule of law after the war. In Koidu, a young man explained 
that not even a strong commander would now be immune:
I say the Special Court is fine, because that will give cause for 
the war to stop. [Or] for any other plan back again. Even if it is 
[popular rebel commander] who did bad, that no one [would 
have] arrest[ed], now people will say stop, because the law will 
3 “Wetin na di Speshal Kot” (Special Court for 
Sierra Leone 2004). Despite its Krio title, the book-
let’s language is English.
4 A former refugee camp nearby Freetown where 
many of the war-displaced settled.
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arrest him. If they would not have done that, people would not 
have stopped to do bad.
(man in his early thirties, Koidu, February 2011)
3. Conclusions
For many Sierra Leoneans, the Special Court is not per-
ceived as having delivered justice to those affected by the 
war. So far, in academic discourse, the many reports about 
the Court’s legalistic procedures seem to ignore the fact 
that many Sierra Leoneans talk about justice as something 
that should affect them directly – for example in the form 
of efforts to restore their livelihoods. At the same time, 
Sierra Leoneans’ perception of their own judicial system is 
characterized by mistrust which is partly the result of its 
unfairness. This also has to be seen in the context of struc-
tural inequality that many experience in their everyday 
lives; “justice” would include the removal of these inequal-
ities. Knowing this, many Sierra Leoneans never expected 
the Special Court to provide “justice” for them in the first 
place, since what it could offer would have little relevance 
for them. V. S. Naipaul wrote that “You couldn’t listen to 
sweet songs about injustice unless you expected justice and 
received it much of the time” (1979, 149), holding a mirror 
to the (Western) reader: in many societies justice is not 
normality and cannot simply be done. Theories of justice 
that are independent of the functioning of legal systems, 
such as the widespread belief in God’s judgement I found 
in Sierra Leone, may serve as a way of making sense of 
injustice.
Transitional justice practitioners should therefore critically 
assess what they constitute as “justice.” As Rama Mani 
argued, “peace-builders” have difficulties acknowledging 
the complexities of post-conflict societies where con-
ceptions of injustice often include structural inequalities 
experienced in pre- and postwar contexts. By focusing on 
retributive justice alone institutions such as the Special 
Court thus leave other injustices untouched: “if ideas and 
institutions about as fundamental and personal a value as 
justice are imposed from outside without internal reson-
ance, they may flounder, notwithstanding their assertion of 
universality” (Mani 2002, 49). As Lundy and McGovern 
(2008) argue, in order to make transitional justice institu-
tions more meaningful to the people they are supposed to 
serve, the participatory process should start from the very 
conception of these institutions. Simply involving people 
in the implementation phase, as the Special Court did 
through its outreach work, is not enough. Moreover, the 
A woman in Waterloo told us that whilst the war had 
already “spoiled” their lives, the arrest of the leaders still 
has a deterrent effect: “Those ones, they are in prison. 
What they have done, they have already done it. It’s just a 
formality. But if other people are having intentions, with 
this same badness, they will be afraid” (woman in her 
fifties, Waterloo, November 2010).
That said, the main reasons why Sierra Leoneans experience 
peace today are only marginally related to the work of the 
Court. On the one hand, there is no (political) continuation 
of the war ideology. After large-scale disarmament by the 
UN mission, which is believed to have disarmed the great 
majority of (armed) combatants, no hostilities have broken 
out between the former fighting factions. Moreover, since the 
armed groups were not ideologically motivated, the war as 
such has not been politicized on a large scale (International 
Crisis Group 2008). This distinguishes the context of the 
Special Court from other international war crimes tribunals 
like the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia or the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia, which operate in highly politicized surroundings.
On the other hand, peace was established in everyday life. 
People’s experience of more than ten years of peaceful 
coexistence contributes greatly to their feeling that peace 
will hold. At the signing of the 1999 peace accord President 
Kabbah asked Sierra Leoneans to “forgive and forget,” and 
this has become a widely adopted discourse (Shaw 2010). 
While people in harder-hit areas such as Tombodu 
expressed their difficulties with the situation, they still 
argued that their decision to allow ex-combatants to live 
among them is one of the main reasons the peace holds. 
Even in the bigger cities, to which the majority of the 
ex-combatants (as well as young people in general) have 
moved, civilians and ex-combatants interact peacefully in 
many ways (Peters 2007). In the neighborhood where I 
stayed in Freetown, for example, CDF fighters who were 
deployed there during the war decided to stay and have 
been accepted by the residents.
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Sierra Leonean case demonstrates that a discussion about 
possible alternatives to the Special Court might have 
proven insightful as well.
On the other hand, the perception of the Court’s impact 
on enforcing peace can be seen in a more positive light. 
People approved of the Court because it was perceived as 
part of the (international) institutions that ended the war. 
The detention of leaders of the fighting factions, pre-
venting them from inciting another round of violence, is 
popularly understood as the main accomplishment of the 
Court. In the eyes of many, though, accountability served 
primarily as a means to regain control, rather than punish-
ing the perpetrators. Moreover, the peace in Sierra Leone is 
of course not the making of international institutions 
alone. The willingness of ordinary people to keep the peace 
on an everyday basis, for example by tolerating ex-com-
batants among them, has contributed crucially to the sta-
bility of peace.
Finally, transitional justice practitioners could be more 
realistic about how much institutions such as the Special 
Court can influence a specific context (McEvoy 2007). The 
data presented in this article demonstrates that the rather 
small impact of the Special Court on people’s lives was 
mostly due to its design and set up. However, the often 
grandiose rhetoric used by Court officials and others mir-
rors the high expectations many had in the capability and 
reach of such an institution. In this light, Special Court 
officials can be criticized for their ignorance of the context 
they operated in, which led them to such bold promises of 
“justice” and “peace.” As I have shown, these claims are for 
a large part based on assumptions, and as soon as the 
everyday situation of many Sierra Leoneans is taken into 
consideration, such promises seem out of place.
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